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An Examination of Interpretive Bias Induction on Cognitive and Symptom Variables 
Associated with Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
Nicole Gervais 
The purpose of the present study was to examine the potential causal role of interpretive 
bias in cognitive vulnerability to generalized anxiety disorder and its primary symptom, 
worry. An interpretive bias induction paradigm developed by Mathews and Macintosh 
(2000) was used to modify participants' interpretations of ambiguous scenarios. Sixty-
nine (69) individuals were randomly assigned to either the negative induction group {n = 
35) or the positive induction group (n =34). Following training, participants completed 
two measures of intolerance of uncertainty (IU), a cognitive vulnerability factor 
implicated in worry, and an interview related to processes involved in worry. Among the 
two measures of IU, one was a self-report questionnaire measuring explicit beliefs about 
uncertainty, while the other was a computerized task designed to assess automatic threat 
associations related to uncertainty. It was hypothesized that compared to the positive 
induction group, the negative induction group would evidence: (1) more explicit negative 
beliefs about uncertainty, (2) stronger automatic associations related to uncertainty, and 
(3) higher levels of worry. Results revealed that interpretive bias was successfully 
induced, but did not lead to group differences on IU or worry. In contrast to previous 
studies (Mathews & Macintosh, 2000), no effect of the training on state anxiety was 
found. Potential explanations for the discrepant findings are discussed as well as 
treatment implications for interpretive bias modification during therapy. 
iv 
Acknowledgments 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Michel Dugas, for his 
guidance, expertise, and dedication. I'd also like to thank my thesis committee members, 
Dr. Adam Radomsky and Dr. Natalie Phillips for their thoughtful feedback on this 
project. I'd also like to thank Dr. Naomi Koerner not only for her assistance with the 
project, but also her considerable support. Thank you to my labmates for their assistance 
with adapting the training paradigm. I would especially like to thank Kristin Anderson for 
her immense help with recruiting, coordinating, and interviewing potential participants. 
Without her, this project would not have been conducted so smoothly. I would also like 
to thank Constantina Stamoulos and Stephanie Bender for their assistance with data 
entry, and Tara Gralnick for her immense help with scoring the Catastrophizing 
Interview. I am truly lucky to have had the help and support provided to me during the 
various stages of this project. 
I would also like to thank Dr. Andrew Mathews for kindly allowing me to use his 
interpretive bias paradigm. 
This research was supported by fellowships from the Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research (CIHR) and le Fonds de la recherche en sante du Quebec (FRSQ), and 
by a research grant from CIHR. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
v 
LIST OF FIGURES VII 
LIST OF TABLES VIII 
INTRODUCTION 1 
COGNITIVE VULNERABILITY 1 
Beliefs about uncertainty... 2 
Automatic associations related to uncertainty 4 
INTERPRETIVE BIAS 6 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COGNITIVE VULNERABILITY AND INTERPRETIVE BIAS 8 
CAUSAL ROLE OF INTERPRETIVE BIAS IN ANXIETY DISORDERS 10 
WORRY AS A PROCESS , 13 





Diagnostic interview 19 
Baseline measures 20 
Induction training 22 
Manipulation check 24 
Post-induction measures 25 
RESULTS 29 
PREPARATION OF IAT SCORE 29 
INTER-RATER AGREEMENT 29 
vi 
DATA SCREENING 30 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES 30 
INDUCTION TRAINING 31 
Response times to probe trials 31 
Manipulation check 32 
MAIN ANALYSES 32 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 33 
Implicit Association Test 33 
Catastrophizing Interview 34 
DISCUSSION ...34 
REFERENCES 45 
APPENDIX A: PRELIMINRY SCREENING 61 
APPENDIX B: STATE-TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY (FORM Y) -
TRAIT 65 
APPENDIX C: BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY, SECOND EDITION 68 
APPENDIX D: SOCIAL DESIRABILITY SCALE-SHORT FORM 73 
APPENDIX E: VISUAL ANALOGUE SCALES 75 
APPENDIX F: INTOLERANCE OF UNCERTAINTY SCALE 80 
APPENDIX G: STIMULUS WORDS FOR IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION 
TEST 84 
APPENDIX H: CONSEQUENCE SEVERITY GRID 86 
APPENDIX I: POWER ANALYSES 90 
vii 
List of Figures 
Figures Page 
1. Average response time (RT) to solve word fragments of 
negative and positive probes for the negative (n = 35) 
and positive (n = 34) induction groups 59 
2. Ratings of negatively and positively-valenced foil and 
feasible interpretations for the negative {n = 35) and 
positive (n = 34) induction groups 60 
List of Tables 
Table 
1. Mean and Standard Deviation for Baseline Measures for 
Induction Groups and Total Sample (N = 69) 
2. Mean and Standard Deviation for VAS scores for 
Induction Groups and Total Sample (N = 69) 
3. Mean and Standard Deviation for IUS, IAT, 
CI for Induction Groups and Total Sample (TV = 69) 
1 
Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is a prevalent, chronic, and disabling 
condition characterized by excessive and uncontrollable worry (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). This disorder is costly both to the individual and society, as it has 
been shown to lead to decreased work productivity and higher use of health care services 
(Whittchen & Hoyer, 2001). A number of effective psychological treatments have been 
developed for GAD, most of which are based on Beck's cognitive model of anxiety 
disorders (Beck & Clark, 1997). According to this model, individuals with anxiety 
disorders possess cognitive structures (or schemas) containing negative beliefs related to 
threat or danger. In addition, the cognitive structures are believed to reflect automatic 
associations (Segal 1988; Teachman, Marker, & Smith-Janik, 2008). Once activated, the 
cognitive structures are thought to automatically facilitate the biased processing of 
information, leading the individual to misperceive the existence of threat or danger in the 
environment. These information-processing biases, which include both automatic and 
strategic modes of processing, are believed to be involved in both the development and 
maintenance of all anxiety disorders (Beck & Clark, 1997). 
One particular bias that has received considerable empirical support for its role in 
GAD is the tendency to interpret ambiguity in a threatening manner (see Macleod & 
Rutherford, 2004, for a review). This interpretive bias is believed to contribute to the 
development and maintenance of excessive and uncontrollable worry, the core feature of 
GAD. Before discussing the role of interpretive bias in GAD, evidence in support of the 
role of cognitive structures as a vulnerability factor for GAD will be reviewed. 
Cognitive Vulnerability 
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Beliefs about uncertainty. In the literature on GAD, vulnerability has been 
assessed primarily from a cognitive perspective. One cognitive vulnerability factor linked 
to GAD is intolerance of uncertainty (IU), which is defined as a dispositional 
characteristic arising from a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its implications 
(Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). Such negative beliefs include that uncertainty is 
unacceptable, reflects badly on a person, and leads to feelings of frustration, stress, and 
the inability to act (Buhr & Dugas, 2002, 2006). The available data suggest a robust 
relationship between IU and worry. Not only is IU highly and specifically related to 
worry (Dugas, Schwartz, & Francis, 2004; Ladouceur et al., 1999), it also shares a 
stronger association with level of worry than with symptoms of depression and other 
anxiety disorders (Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001; Roberts, Gervais, & Dugas, 
2006; Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003). Level of IU also appears to be higher in 
individuals diagnosed with GAD than those diagnosed with panic disorder (Dugas, 
Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005), and has been shown to be higher in individuals with 
moderate to severe GAD than in those with mild GAD (Dugas et al., 2007). The 
relationship between IU and worry remains relatively strong even after accounting for 
level of anxiety and depression (Buhr & Dugas, 2002, 2006). Level of IU also appears to 
be relatively independent of fluctuations in mood and anxiety. When using the 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 
1994) to assess level of IU, responses have been shown to remain relatively stable over a 
5-week interval. Despite this stability, IU appears to be malleable and changes in IU have 
been shown to precede changes in worry level during cognitive-behavioural treatment for 
GAD (Dugas, Langlois, Rheaume, & Ladouceur, 1998). Using time-series analysis to 
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assess the temporal relationship between daily ratings of IU and percent time spent 
worrying throughout therapy, Dugas and colleagues observed that change in IU preceded 
change in worry for the majority of participants. Thus, not only does IU appear to share a 
robust relationship with worry, change in IU appears to precede change in worry. 
In addition to the correlational research presented above, there is also increasing 
experimental evidence for the role of IU in worry. For example, Ladouceur, Gosselin, 
and Dugas (2000) used an experimental approach to assess the impact of modifying IU 
on worry. Using a gambling procedure where the appraisal of the probability of winning 
was manipulated, the authors observed that changes in IU associated with the task 
resulted in changes in level of worry in the expected direction. The results from this study 
suggest that IU levels can be successfully manipulated, and that manipulation of IU 
results in differences in worry levels. A subsequent study conducted by Grenier and 
Ladouceur (2004) found additional support for the role of IU in worry. The authors used 
a different modification procedure, whereby participants were first asked to imagine 
ingesting medication, then to repeat aloud statements reflecting either increased or 
decreased IU. Results indicate that level of IU was modified in the expected direction and 
that participants who's IU was increased demonstrated significantly more worry than 
those who's IU was decreased. More recently, Rosen and Knauper (2009) examined the 
impact of manipulating both IU and situational uncertainty, on information seeking 
behaviour and worry level. The authors differentiated IU from situational uncertainty 
(SU) by stating that the former refers to a trait whereas the latter refers to a characteristic 
of a given situation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions; High 
IU and SU, High IU and Low SU, Low IU and High SU, and Low IU and Low SU. IU 
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was manipulated linguistically using a paradigm used in a previous study (Rosen, 
Knauper, & Sammut, 2007), whereby the experimenters changed qualifiers for all items 
to either increase the probability of endorsement in the case of the High IU groups or 
decrease in the case of the Low IU groups. Further, false feedback was provided to 
further increase or decrease IU depending on group membership. In addition, SU was 
manipulated by having participants read information about a fictitious virus to which they 
were introduced. The information was provided to either increase or decrease uncertainty 
about whether or not they had contracted the virus. Following these manipulations, the 
High IU and SU group sought more information and reported significantly more worry 
relative to the Low IU and SU group. Taken together, these three studies demonstrate that 
modifying IU leads to changes in worry. 
Thus, the available data support the notion that IU is a cognitive vulnerability 
factor for GAD. Although cognitive theory of anxiety disorders (Beck & Clark, 1997) 
predicts that symptoms develop via the influence of cognitive vulnerability factors on 
information processing biases, it is important to test this prediction empirically. Thus, in 
addition to establishing IU as a putative cognitive vulnerability factor for GAD, it is also 
critical to determine its influence on proximal risk factors such as biases in information 
processing. It is also necessary to establish the precise role of such proximal risk factors 
in IU and worry. 
Automatic associations related to uncertainty. Attempts to measure cognitive 
structures (or cognitive vulnerability) in anxiety disorders have typically involved self-
report methods. These methods, which typically assess explicit beliefs, tap into slower, 
more voluntary cognitive processes. However, cognitive vulnerability may also be 
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characterized by associations represented in memory (Segal, 1988) that are activated 
automatically and difficult to control (Teachman et al., 2008). Automatic associations 
have been conceptualized as evaluations of stimuli that influence one's responses without 
awareness that an evaluation has been made (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). These 
associations are thought to influence subsequent processing and behaviour (De Houwer 
& Hermans, 2001). Individuals with anxiety disorders have been conceptualized as 
possessing stronger automatic threat associations relative to non-anxious controls. In 
other words, representations of associations involving an evaluation of stimuli are 
believed to be stored in memory and when the stimuli are perceived as threatening, these 
associations are thought to be stronger in individuals with anxiety disorders relative to 
non-anxious individuals. These associations are believed to act at an automatic level of 
processing, outside of awareness. 
Evidence for the role of automatic associations in anxiety disorders has 
accumulated. For example, Teachman, Smith-Janik, and Saporito (2007) were able to 
successfully differentiate individuals with panic disorder from non-anxious controls 
based on their automatic associations for panic stimuli. Using a response time (RT) task, 
participants were presented with a series of word stimuli on a computer screen and were 
asked to categorize them as either descriptive of themselves or others. The word stimuli 
denoted either panic symptoms (e.g., scared) or opposing concepts, such as calm (e.g., 
relaxed). RTs categorizing word-stimuli as threat-consistent (e.g., panic-descriptive of 
self; calm-descriptive of others) were compared to RTs categorizing word-stimuli as 
threat-inconsistent (e.g., panic-descriptive of others; calm-descriptive of self), and a 
difference score was calculated for each participant. Participants with panic disorder had 
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significantly larger difference scores than non-anxious participants, with shorter RTs to 
threat-consistent trials than threat-inconsistent trials. This suggests that automatic panic 
associations are stronger in those with panic disorder than in non-anxious controls. Using 
the same task, De Jong, Pasman, Kindt and van den Hout (2001) were able to distinguish 
socially anxious from non-socially anxious participants on socially relevant automatic 
associations. The authors reported that socially anxious participants evidenced stronger 
automatic associations to socially-relevant word stimuli compared to non-socially 
anxious participants. In addition to distinguishing clinically anxious from non-anxious 
individuals, automatic threat-related associations have been shown to change during 
treatment for patients with panic disorder (Teachman et al., 2008) and spider phobia 
(Teachman & Woody, 2003). In addition, Teachman and colleagues (2008) observed that 
attenuations in the strength of automatic associations related to threat were correlated 
with symptom reduction. To date, no research has assessed the presence of automatic 
threat associations in GAD. Given that negative beliefs about uncertainty are known to be 
involved in this condition, perhaps there are automatic threat associations involved in 
GAD concerning stimuli denoting uncertainty. Stated differently, perhaps individuals 
who hold negative beliefs about uncertainty also possess stronger threat associations for 
stimuli denoting uncertainty than individuals who do not hold such beliefs. 
Interpretive Bias 
Research demonstrates that GAD is associated with the tendency to misinterpret 
ambiguous information as threatening; further, this tendency is thought to contribute to 
an increase in worry and anxiety levels (Macleod & Rutherford, 2004). Support for this 
association comes from a range of studies, including those using homophones to compare 
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patients with GAD to nonclinical control participants. Overall, patients display a greater 
tendency to interpret audio taped homophones negatively than do control participants 
(Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989). Other studies comparing high and low trait 
anxious participants found a similar pattern of results (see Macleod & Rutherford, 2004, 
for a review). Some have argued that the observed findings are the result of response 
biases, whereby anxious individuals are more likely to choose the more negative or 
threatening interpretation (Mathews & Macleod, 1994). Subsequent studies examining 
the relationship between interpretive bias and anxiety using different methodologies have 
found converging evidence for an interpretive bias associated with GAD, while 
controlling for the effects of possible response biases. For example, Eysenck, Mogg, 
May, Richards, and Mathews (1991) compared individuals with GAD to non-anxious 
controls in terms of their ability to remember previously-presented sentences that were 
either clear in meaning, or ambiguous, to allow for both threatening and non-threatening 
interpretations. Following a delay, participants were presented with new sentences, some 
of which contained disambiguated versions of the ambiguous sentences seen previously. 
The authors also included emotionally-valenced sentences unrelated to the previously 
presented sentences. Participants were asked to indicate which sentences they 
remembered seeing in the first part of the study. Significant differences were reported 
between the anxious and control group for negatively disambiguated sentences 
corresponding to sentences seen previously, but not to the negatively-valenced foil 
sentences, thus disconfirming the possibility that the between-group differences are due 
to a generalized response bias in the anxious group. An anxiety-related memory bias can 
also not be excluded as a possible alternate explanation. However, other procedures have 
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been designed to assess current or "online" interpretations to help determine whether 
such a bias is involved. For instance, Marcel (1980) reported a difference between high 
and low trait-anxious participants in the processing of "target" words when the meaning 
of the target word was related to the threatening interpretation of a homograph "prime" 
word that preceded it. High trait-anxious participants responded quicker to these targets 
than did low trait-anxious participants, suggesting that high levels of trait anxiety are 
linked to an increased tendency to interpret ambiguity in a threatening manner (Marcel, 
1980). Thus, the extant data support the existence of a relationship between the presence 
of GAD and the tendency to interpret ambiguity in a threatening manner. Although it 
does not appear likely that the results reported above are due to either a response or 
memory bias, it is difficult to determine whether observed differences between patients 
with GAD and non-anxious controls reflect differences in trait anxiety rather than 
differences in GAD status. More research is necessary to help clarify this matter. 
Relationship between Cognitive Vulnerability and Interpretive Bias 
Whereas one study found no support for a relationship between IU and 
interpretive bias (Rassin & Muris, 2005), the majority of studies have found either some 
support (Cantor, Gervais, & Dugas, 2008; Dellerba, Gervais, & Dugas, 2007) or strong 
support (Dugas & Gervais, 2007; Dugas, Hedayati et al., 2005; Koerner & Dugas, 2008). 
Rassin and Muris (2005) assessed interpretive bias using the ambiguous subscale of the 
Ambiguous/Unambiguous Situations Diary (AUSD; Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & 
Davidson, 1992), which is a vignette task that includes 14 ambiguously worded 
scenarios. Respondents were asked to read each scenario while imagining being in the 
situation, then to indicate whether they were concerned or not. The authors were 
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interested in predicting concern from level of IU, indecisiveness, depression, trait 
anxiety, and worry. Results indicate that indecisiveness was the only significant predictor 
of threat interpretations, suggesting that the more indecisive an individual is, the more 
likely they are to interpret ambiguity in a threatening manner. A follow-up study (Cantor 
et al., 2008) was carried out using an extended version of the ambiguous subscale of the 
AUSD (Koerner & Dugas, 2008) that included a wider array of scenarios. Although none 
of the relationships were significantly different, IU did correlate significantly and 
positively with threatening interpretations of ambiguous scenarios whereas indecisiveness 
did not. 
In addition to assessing the strength of the association between IU and interpretive 
bias, other studies have examined the ability of IU to predict interpretive bias beyond 
related variables. For example, after accounting for demographic variables, level of 
anxiety, depression, and worry, Dugas, Hedayati and colleagues (2005) found that IU 
predicted 11% of the variance in threat ratings of ambiguous scenarios. Participants more 
intolerant of uncertainty were also found to have significantly higher threat ratings of 
ambiguous scenarios than those more tolerant of uncertainty. In a follow-up study, 
Koerner and Dugas (2008) compared participants who were more intolerant of 
uncertainty (i.e., High IU group) to those who were less intolerant (i.e., Low IU group) in 
terms of their respective tendency to worry excessively and interpret ambiguous 
scenarios as threatening. Results indicated that after accounting for the variance 
explained by sex, worry, GAD somatic symptoms, trait anxiety, and depression, the High 
IU group made significantly more threat interpretations of ambiguous scenarios relative 
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to the Low IU group. No group differences were observed in threat ratings made for both 
positive and negative non-ambiguous scenarios. 
Despite the discrepant findings, the weight of the evidence suggests that IU and 
interpretive bias are related. Koerner and Dugas (2008) were interested in further 
understanding the role of IU in GAD. Specifically, they assessed the prediction made by 
cognitive theory (Beck & Clark, 1997) that cognitive vulnerability leads to the expression 
of symptoms via its effect on information processing. They were particularly interested in 
determining whether the presence of IU makes one vulnerable to developing excessive 
worry and whether this influence occurs as a function of IU's predicted effect on threat 
interpretations of ambiguity. In other words, does interpretive bias mediate the 
relationship between IU and worry? Given that the study conducted by Koerner and 
Dugas was correlational, this question was assessed using Baron and Kenny's (1986) test 
of mediation. The results partially support the role of interpretive bias as a mediator in the 
relationship between IU and worry: threat interpretations of ambiguous scenarios were 
found to partially mediate the relationship between IU and worry. However, in the 
reverse mediation analysis, worry was found to be a partial mediator of the relationship 
between IU and interpretive bias. These results suggest that interpretive bias and worry 
may have a reciprocal relationship. In order to clarify the role of interpretive bias in the 
relationship between IU and worry, experimental research manipulating interpretations of 
ambiguity is necessary. 
Causal Role of Interpretive Bias in Anxiety Disorders 
Research over the last ten years has begun assessing the causal role of interpretive 
bias in anxiety. Mathews and Macintosh (2000) developed an interpretive induction 
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paradigm in which nonclinical participants were trained to interpret personally relevant, 
emotionally ambiguous social situations in either a negative, benign or positive fashion. 
The paradigm was presented on a computer screen and involved 104 trials, 64 of which 
served to induce the congruent interpretive bias. The remaining trials included probe 
trials that served as an initial measure of interpretation, and emotionally neutral (or filler) 
trials. The trials consisted of social situations three lines in length, which remained 
ambiguous until the final word. The final word was presented as a word fragment and 
when solved correctly, clarified the emotional meaning (or valence) of the scenario. The 
series of experiments described by Mathews and Macintosh demonstrated not only that 
an interpretive bias can be successfully induced, but that it could also result in congruent 
changes in state anxiety when participants actively generated the interpretations. 
Subsequent studies have reported consistent findings (Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 
2007a,b; Yiend, Macintosh, & Mathews, 2005). 
When assessing the validity of the training paradigm by Mathews and Macintosh 
(2000), it was found that the effect of training did not generalize to other tasks evaluating 
interpretations (Salemink et al., 2007b, Salemink et al., in press). However, when using 
the same task, the paradigm has been shown to generalize to another domain (Salemink et 
al., in press). Despite consisting of scenarios related solely to social anxiety, the 
interpretive bias training paradigm has been used successfully to modify interpretations 
of scenarios related to academic performance. Further, the impact of training appears to 
persist for at least 24 hours (Macintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006; 
Yiend et al., 2005) and to withstand changes in context (i.e., testing in different room 
than training) and presentation modality (i.e., either acoustically or visually; Macintosh et 
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al., 2006). Taken together, these data suggest the training paradigm presented by 
Mathews and Macintosh is viable, but may not generalize across other tasks of 
interpretation. 
To further assess the causal role of interpretive bias in anxiety, researchers have 
assessed the impact of interpretive bias training on anxiety vulnerability, or subsequent 
reactivity to a stressor. Studies using the training paradigm presented above have 
produced mixed findings. Specifically, Macintosh and colleagues (2006) assessed the 
impact of inducing interpretive bias on subsequent reactivity to a stressful video. Results 
indicate that relative to the positive training condition, the negative training condition 
was associated with an increase in anxiety in response to viewing a stressful video on the 
following day. A more recent study by Salemink and colleagues (2007a) reported 
divergent findings. Anxiety reactivity was induced following interpretive bias training 
using an anagram task. Although increases in level of anxiety and depression were 
reported following the stressor, this increase did not differ across groups. 
Despite the results described by Salemink and colleagues, the majority of the research 
examining the causal role of interpretive bias on subsequent anxiety reactivity is 
consistent with Macintosh and colleagues' findings (e.g., Wilson, Macleod, Mathews, & 
Rutherford, 2006). Nevertheless, more research is needed to determine the precise role of 
interpretive bias in vulnerability to anxiety in general and to specific disorders. For 
instance, it remains to be seen whether inducing interpretive bias results in congruent 
changes in worry (the primary symptom of GAD), in IU, or in both. Given that Koerner 
and Dugas (2008) reported that threatening interpretations of ambiguity mediated the 
relationship between IU and worry, and that worry mediated the relationship between IU 
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and threatening interpretations, it is important to consider the potential effects of inducing 
an interpretive bias on both cognitive vulnerability and the expression of symptoms. 
Worry as a Process 
As mentioned previously, research has demonstrated a significant association 
between worry and interpretive bias (Cantor et al., 2008; Davey et al., 1992; Dellerba et 
al., 2007; Dugas, Hedayati et al., 2005; Koerner & Dugas, 2008; Zalta & Chambless, 
2008). Although the above-mentioned studies assessed the general tendency to worry, 
other characteristics of the worry process may also be important. For instance, using the 
Catastrophizing Interview technique (c.f. Vasey & Borkovec, 1992), Provencher, 
Freeston, Dugas, and Ladouceur (2000) found that high worriers rated the occurrence of 
each self-generated feared outcome as more likely relative to low worriers. Further, the 
final feared outcome generated for each worry topic was rated as more severe in the High 
Worry group relative to the Low Worry group. Vasey and Borkovec (1992) reported 
similar findings using the catastrophizing technique. They found that high worriers 
generated more feared outcomes for each worry topic, rated them as more probable, and 
demonstrated an increase in discomfort during the catastrophizing sequence relative to 
low worriers. 
It can be argued that the Catastrophizing Interview is superior to standard self-
report worry measures (such as the Perm State Worry Questionnaire; Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) as it assesses aspects of the worry process that are more 
closely linked to the cognitive fear structure (Provencher et al., 2000). Aspects assessed 
via the catastrophizing technique include the ultimate feared consequence of one's worry 
(worst case scenario) generated in later stages of the catastrophizing sequence and 
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measured via interviewer ratings of the severity of the final feared outcome. Thus, the 
Catastrophizing Interview may be quite sensitive to changes in the cognitive fear 
structure that are expected to occur following brief modifications to processes influencing 
the fear structure, including modifying interpretations of ambiguity. 
The findings generated using the Catastrophizing Interview (Provencher et al., 
2000; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992) are consistent with those reported by Butler and 
Mathews (1983), who used standard self-report measures. Butler and Mathews found that 
high-anxious participants rated negative outcomes as more probable and more costly 
relative to low-anxious participants. Interestingly, it has been found that worry severity is 
positively correlated with perceived probability and perceived personal cost associated 
with feared outcomes (Berenbaum, Thompson, & Bredemeier, 2007; Berenbaum, 
Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007; Dellerba et al., 2007). In addition, perceived probability, 
perceived personal cost, and the interaction between the two have been found to predict 
worry severity (Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007). Dellerba and colleagues 
reported that perceived personal cost mediated the relationship between IU and 
threatening interpretations of ambiguity. Given this evidence, it seems plausible that 
modifying interpretations of ambiguity would lead to subsequent changes in perceived 
cost or severity of the final feared consequence when using the catastrophizing technique. 
Although Dellerba and colleagues found no evidence that perceived probability mediates 
the relationship between IU and interpretive bias, the findings reported by Berenbaum, 
Thompson, and Pomerantz (2007) suggest that interpretive bias induction would lead to 
changes in perceived probability of consequences associated with worries. Less is known 
about the importance of the length of catastrophic sequences associated with a worry. 
15 
However, given the findings reported by Vasey and Borkovec (1992), it is possible that 
inducing a negative interpretive bias would also lead to longer catastrophic sequences 
associated with a worry, whereas induction of a positive interpretive bias would have the 
reverse effect. 
Goals and Hypotheses 
Despite strong evidence suggesting that worry is associated with the tendency to 
interpret ambiguity in a threatening manner (Cantor et ah, 2008; Davey et al., 1992; 
Dellerba et al., 2007; Dugas et al., 2005; Koerner & Dugas, 2008; Zalta & Chambless, 
2008), little is known about the precise role of interpretive bias in the worry process. 
Although it has been shown that successful treatment of GAD involves decreases in both 
negative beliefs about uncertainty and worry (Dugas et al., 2007), it is not known whether 
decreases in interpretive bias also occur during successful treatment. It also remains to be 
seen whether reducing a negative interpretive bias will result in decreases in both 
negative beliefs about uncertainty and worry. Given the correlational evidence presented 
by Koerner and Dugas (2008), it is possible that modifying interpretive bias would have 
multiple effects; influencing both the cognitive fear structure, or cognitive vulnerability, 
and worry. Although cognitive vulnerability is believed to include explicit negative 
beliefs about uncertainty; strong automatic associations involving uncertainty and threat 
may also be a characteristic. Thus, it is possible that inducing interpretive bias would 
result in congruent changes in both explicit beliefs about uncertainty and in the strength 
of the automatic associations related to uncertainty. In addition, interpretive bias 
induction is also expected to result in congruent changes in the worry processes that are 
closely associated with cognitive vulnerability (i.e., IU). Thus, the goal of the current 
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study was to investigate the causal role of interpretive bias in worry by determining 
whether it exerts effects on the expression of this symptom as well as on IU. It was 
predicted that compared to individuals trained to interpret ambiguity in a positive (or 
non-threatening) manner (positive interpretive bias), individuals trained to interpret 
ambiguity in a threatening manner (negative interpretive bias) would: (1) report 
significantly more negative beliefs about uncertainty; (2) have stronger automatic 
associations between uncertainty and threat; (3) report higher levels of worry, as 
evidenced by longer catastrophic sequences, higher average probability ratings, and more 
severe final consequences for each worry generated. 
Method 
Participants 
The final sample consisted of 69 participants (66.7% female) between the ages of 
18 and 53 (M= 28.45, SD = 9.57) recruited from the local community. Most of the 
participants spoke English as a first language (66.7%), whereas the remaining 
participants reported a first language other than English (27.5%), or reported English and 
an additional language as their first language (5.8%). Most participants described 
themselves as being of European descent (66.67%). Of the remaining 33.33%, six (8.6%) 
reported being of African descent, four (5.8%) of Asian descent, three (4.35%) as 
Latino/Hispanic, two (2.9%) as Middle-Eastern, two (2.9%) as bi-racial, and the 
remaining six (8.6%) did not classify themselves in any of the ethnic categories that were 
provided. Seventy percent (70%) of participants were full-time students, 11 (23%) of 
which were also currently working full-time, 20 (41.67%) working part-time, and 16 
(33.33%) not working at the time the data were collected. Three (4%) of participants 
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reported being part-time students, one of which was working full-time, another working 
part-time, and the third was not working at the time the data were collected. Of the 26% 
of participants who were not students, 10 (55.56%) were working full-time, two (11.11%) 
part-time, and six (33.33%) were not working at the time the data were collected. 
Procedure 
Two hundred and twenty-one (221) individuals contacted the Anxiety Disorders 
Laboratory of Concordia University between March and August 2008 regarding 
participation in response to advertisements placed both in the local community and on 
one of the university's campuses. The lab's research coordinator described the study's 
purpose as involving an examination of the association between perception and anxiety. 
She also provided information pertaining to the study's inclusion criteria and procedures. 
The general inclusion criteria included the following: a) age between 18-55, b) fluent in 
English, c) no evidence of current substance abuse or suicidal intent, d) no history of 
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, e) a score no greater than a "2" on the Clinician's 
Severity Rating (CSR) of the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-
IV; Brown, Di Nardo, & Barlow, 1994) and Mini International Neuropsychiatric 
Interview, version 5.0 (MINI 5.0, Sheehan et al., 1998) for unipolar depression, f) no 
change in type or dose of anxiolytic or hypnotic medication in the last four weeks, no 
change in the last 12 weeks for antidepressant medication, g) no use of any 
benzodiazepine on an "as needed" (i.e., p.r.n.) basis, and h) no evidence of anxiety 
symptoms due to a general medical condition. Of the initial 221 callers, 67 were no 
longer interested in participating, and 15 did not meet inclusion criteria and therefore 
were not contacted again. During a second telephone conversation, the research 
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coordinator conducted a preliminary screening (see Appendix A for a copy of the 
screening questions) and the MINI 5.0 over the telephone with 139 individuals after 
obtaining verbal consent. The total duration of this telephone interview (including 
screening) varied from 15-45 minutes. Following the telephone interview, 81 individuals 
were invited to the laboratory. However, 5 of the 81 were no longer interested in 
participating. Thus, 76 participants signed an informed consent form, and completed the 
ADIS-IV, administered by the primary investigator (Nicole Gervais). The duration of 
administration varied from 30-180 minutes, and participants were compensated $20 for 
their time. Four participants did not meet inclusion criteria according to the ADIS-IV, 
and two no longer wished to participant. Thus, 70 participants returned to the laboratory, 
where they were first asked to complete a battery of quasi-counterbalanced 
questionnaires, including a demographics form, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y) -
Trait (Spielberger 1983), Beck Depression Inventory, second edition (Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996), Social Desirability Scale-Short Form (Reynolds, 1982), and Visual 
Analogue Scales (VAS; McCormack, Home, & Sheather, 1988). Following completion 
of all baseline measures, participants were seated in front of an IBM computer, used to 
run the induction training, manipulation check, and Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), which were programmed using E-Prime 
version 1.2 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). Participants were first asked to 
complete ten practice trials, prior to commencing the induction training. The practice 
trials enabled participants to familiarize themselves with the order in which to make 
responses (i.e., to press the "spacebar" prior to solving the word fragment). Following the 
practice trials, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two induction groups (n 
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= 35 for the negative group, n = 34 for the positive group) and began the training session. 
Participants completed the manipulation check as well as the VAS for a second time 
before the post-manipulation measures, which included the Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Scale (Freeston et al., 1994), IAT, and Catastrophizing Interview (Provencher et al., 
2000; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992), presented in a counterbalanced order. During 
administration of the IAT, all participants were seated at a distance of 50cm from the 
screen. For those who received the negative induction training, a brief positive-induction 
training was given prior to debriefing to counteract any potential negative effects 
attributed to the training. Debriefing was provided both orally and in writing and 
compensation of $30 was provided at the final visit. The entire session was conducted in 
a sound attenuated room and varied from 90-150 minutes. 
Materials 
Diagnostic interviews. The Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV, 
Current version (ADIS-IV; Brown et al., 1994) is a semi-structured clinical interview 
assessing the presence of anxiety disorders, as defined by DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. In 
addition to anxiety disorders, this interview also can be used to screen for mood 
disorders, somatoform disorders, substance use disorders, psychotic disorders, and 
medical conditions. The ADIS-IV contains a 9-point (0-8) Clinician's Severity Rating 
(CSR) scale that is used to rate the severity of each disorder assessed. A rating of 4 or 
above indicates the presence of a clinically significant disorder, whereas ratings from 1-3 
indicate the presence of subclinical levels of symptomatology. A reliability study 
conducted by Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman, and Campbell (2001) reported good to 
excellent inter-rater agreement for all principal diagnoses (K = .67 to .86), with the 
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exception of dysthymia (K = .22). This indicates improvement over previous versions of 
the ADIS (Brown et al., 2001). 
Mini International Neuropsychiatry Interview, Version 5.0 (MINI 5.0; Sheehan et 
al., 1998) is a brief structured interview designed to assess DSM-IV and ICD-10 
diagnostic criteria for Axis I disorders, including mood and anxiety disorders, substance 
abuse and dependence, psychotic disorders, eating disorders, and suicidal risk. 
Interviewers are asked to indicate either the presence or absence of symptoms. Although 
this interview does not typically provide severity ratings for disorders assessed, the CSR 
scale of the ADIS-IV was included in the MINI for the current study. Unfortunately, no 
psychometric properties are currently available for the more recent version of the MINI. 
However, previous versions have demonstrated generally good to very good agreement 
with the Composite International Diagnostic Interview, (CIDI; Lecrubier et al., 1997), 
good to very good agreement with the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM, patient 
edition (SCID-P), excellent inter-rater reliability, and very good test-retest reliability 
(Sheehan etal., 1997). 
Baseline measures. The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y) - Trait (STAI-T; 
Spielberger 1983) is a 20-item self-report measure assessing the propensity to experience 
anxiety. Respondents are asked to rate each item by indicating how they generally feel 
using a 4-point Likert scale from 1 (Almost Never) to 4 (Almost Always). The maximum 
possible score on the STAI-T is 80. There are nine items on this measure that are inverted 
and summed along with the remaining items to obtain a total score, with higher scores 
indicating greater experience of anxiety. Example items include: "I am happy", which is 
an inverted item, and "I feel nervous and restless". The demonstrated psychometric 
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properties of the STAI-T include excellent internal consistency (a = .89 - .96), acceptable 
to high test-retest reliability from 20-104 days (r = .65 - .86), and concurrent, convergent, 
and discriminant validity (Spielberger 1983). The STAI-T is presented in Appendix B. 
Beck Depression Inventory, second edition (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) is a 21-
item measure assessing the presence and severity of DSM-IV depressive symptoms. 
Nineteen items include four options, differing in severity. The remaining 2 items consist 
of seven options, which assess depressive symptoms that involve change (i.e. 
increase/decrease in appetite/sleep). As such, change is assessed at each level of severity, 
excluding the lowest severity as it indicates the absence of the symptom. Respondents are 
asked to indicate which option best describes them in the past two weeks. The maximum 
possible score on this questionnaire is 63. The BDI-II demonstrates excellent internal 
consistency (a = .92 - .93), high test-retest reliability after one-week (r = .93), and 
adequate content, convergent, and discriminant validity (Beck et al., 1996). The BDI-II is 
presented in Appendix C. 
Social Desirability Scale-Short Form (SDS-SF; Reynolds, 1982) is a 13-item 
measure assessing one's tendency to endorse socially desirable characteristics. 
Respondents are asked to indicate whether each item is true or false. True responses are 
given a value of " 1 " , whereas false responses are given a value of "0". Eight items on this 
measure are inverted and summed along with the remaining items to obtain a total score. 
Lower scores indicate a greater response style tendency towards social desirability. 
Example items include "I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way", which is an 
inverted item, and "I am always courteous even to people who are disagreeable". The 
SDS-SF demonstrates adequate internal consistency (r K-R20~ -76), and evidence of 
convergent validity (Reynolds, 1982). The SDS-SF is presented in Appendix D. 
The Visual Analogue Scales (VAS; McCormack, Home, & Sheather, 1988) were 
used to measure current level of anxiety, sadness, worry, irritability, and fatigue prior to 
the induction training and immediately following assessment of interpretive style. 
Participants were asked to indicate their current level of each state by making marks on 
each of five 100mm lines. Qualifiers for each line were provided and included: 0 (Not at 
all), and 100 (Extremely). The location of each response from the left end of the line was 
measured with a ruler. The VAS is believed to be useful for assessing idiosyncratic 
changes (Crichton, 2001). The five visual analogue scales are presented in Appendix E. 
Induction training. The training consisted of scenarios adapted from those 
developed by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) to induce an interpretive bias. Ten blocks 
of thirteen scenarios, or trials, depicting social events were presented on a computer 
screen. Following each block, participants were given the option to rest. Each block 
included eight induction trials, which were valenced according to the direction of the 
training. For the negative induction group, these trials were disambiguated negatively, 
whereas for the positive induction group, they were disambiguated positively. The 
remaining five trials per block were fixed, as the outcomes of these trials were identical 
for both induction groups. These trials included two probes, one that was disambiguated 
negatively and the other positively. The remaining three were filler trials in that their 
outcomes were neutral in valence. Participant RTs to solve the word fragments for both 
negative and positive probes were recorded and served as an initial test for the induction 
of an interpretive bias. 
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Trials within each block were presented in a random order for each participant, 
whereas the blocks were presented in a predetermined order. All scenarios were 
approximately the same length (i.e., 3 lines), and only one line was presented at a time 
per scenario, with the exception of the final line, which was presented without the final 
word. Once all three lines were read, the participant was provided with the missing word, 
presented as a word fragment. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar on the 
computer's keyboard once a solution to the word fragment was known. They were then 
asked to enter in the first missing letter. All scenarios remained ambiguous in valence 
until the final word was solved. Immediately following the scenario, participants were 
asked to answer a comprehension question by responding either "Y" for yes, or "N" for 
no. Feedback for the response was provided such that those congruent with the induction 
training were given positive feedback (i.e. correct answer), whereas incongruent 
responses were given negative feedback (i.e. wrong answer). An example of a complete 
induction trial is as follows: 
You organize a party for your friends every year. Last year, it did not go 
well and so you have changed the plans slightly. You anticipate that the 
problems of the last party will be rep—t-d (repeated)/ fo-got—n 
(forgotten). 
Comprehension question: 
Do you believe you will have problems with your party again this year? 
(Correct answers: "Yes" for negative induction, "No" for positive 
induction). 
Manipulation check. An assessment of interpretation style, or the manipulation 
check, immediately followed the training session. This consisted of two sections; the first 
involved ten scenarios presented in a similar manner to the training scenarios. However, 
these scenarios remained ambiguous after solving the word fragments. Further, although 
comprehension questions were provided, no response feedback was given. Finally, each 
of these new scenarios was presented with a title, which remained visible until the end of 
the trial. An example is as follows: 
The Wedding Reception 
Your friend asks you to give a speech at her wedding reception. You 
prepare some remarks and when the time comes, get to your feet. As you 
speak, you notice some people in the audience start to 1—gh (laugh). 
Comprehension question: 
Did you stand up to speak? 
Immediately following presentation of all ten scenarios, participants were 
provided with four interpretations for each and asked to rate the degree to which they 
were similar in meaning to the scenario they referred to. The title of the corresponding 
scenario was presented at the top-right corner of the screen for each series of 
interpretations. Participants rated the interpretations one at a time, independent of the 
others, using a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (very different in meaning) to 4 (very similar 
in meaning) before progressing the to next series of interpretations. Both the 
interpretations within a series and the series themselves were presented in a random order 
for each participant. Among the four interpretations, two were feasible, including one 
negatively-valence and one positively-valence interpretation, and two foil interpretations, 
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which also included one negatively-valence and one positively-valence interpretation. 
The four interpretations for the ambiguous scenario presented above are the following: 
a) As you speak, some people in the audience find your efforts laughable 
b) As you speak, people in the audience start to laugh appreciatively 
c) As you speak, you notice somebody in the audience start to yawn 
d) As you speak, everyone in the audience bursts into applause 
Post-induction measures. The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; original 
French version: Freeston et al., 1994; English translation: Buhr & Dugas, 2002) is a 27-
item self-report measure assessing the degree to which one possesses negative beliefs 
about uncertainty. Items are rated in terms of how characteristic they are of the 
respondent using a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (Not at all characteristic of 
me) to 5 (Entirely characteristic of me). The maximum possible score on the IUS is 135. 
An example item includes "Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad". 
Although the IUS has two factors including beliefs that "uncertainty has negative 
behavioral and self-referent implications", and "uncertainty is unfair and spoils 
everything" (Sexton & Dugas, 2009), given that the current study was interested in 
general negative beliefs about uncertainty, only the total score was utilized. This measure 
has demonstrated excellent internal consistency (a = .94), adequate test-retest reliability 
at five weeks (r - .74), and good convergent and divergent validity (Buhr & Dugas, 2002, 
2006). The IUS is presented in Appendix F. 
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) measures the relative 
strength of automatic associations between concepts and attributes. Given that automatic 
threat associations are believed to be one aspect of the cognitive fear structure (Teachman 
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et al., 2008), the IAT is thought to assess the relative strength of associations representing 
these structures. Two opposing word-categorizations, such as certain and uncertain, serve 
as concepts and are paired with two opposing word-groupings, such as positive and 
negative, which serve as attributes (such as threatening and non-threatening). Stimulus 
words are presented one at a time and participants are asked to classify them into 
concepts or attributes, a combination of a concept and attribute. For example, the word 
ambiguous is presented at the centre of the screen and participants are asked to classify 
the stimulus as either a "certain" word or an "uncertain" word, as "positive" or 
"negative", as "uncertain/negative" or "certain/positive", or as "uncertain/positive" or 
"certain/negative". The assumption underlying this task is that when an individual 
possesses a strong association between a concept and an attribute, this will be reflected 
by a quicker response to a word stimulus denoting either concept or attribute as compared 
to a word denoting a concept and attribute that are weakly associated. 
The IAT was presented on a computer screen and included 5 blocks of trials. Each 
block involved presenting a list of words in random order, with two categories 
continuously displayed, one at the top left, and the other on the top right of the screen. 
Participants were required to press "Q" with their left hand to classify the stimulus word 
into the category displayed on the top-left corner, and "P" with their right hand to classify 
the word into the category on the top right of the screen. The word remained on the 
screen until either key was pressed. If a mistake occurred, an error sign (e.g. "Wrong 
answer") was presented for 1000ms. Otherwise, an inter-trial interval involving a black 
screen ensued for 400ms prior to the presentation of subsequent stimulus words. Three of 
the five blocks served to pair either concepts or attributes with two response keys and 
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these consisted of blocks one, two, and four. Blocks three and five consisted of pairing 
concepts with attributes, which was either threat consistent (uncertain/negative versus 
certain/positive), or threat inconsistent (uncertain/positive versus certain/negative). 
Blocks one and two served to train participants to press a key in response to words 
categorized as a concept and attribute that would later be combined in block three. Block 
four involved reversing the key associated with the concepts in block one in order to train 
participants to correctly combine concepts and attributes in block five. This block was 
necessary, given that the combinations were reversed to those in block three. 
In the first block, participants were asked to correctly classify 20 words as either 
certain, or uncertain. Half of the words denoted certainty and the remaining half denoted 
uncertainty. The certain category was presented on the top left of the screen, and 
uncertain on the top-right. The subsequent block involved correctly classifying 20 new 
words as either positive or negative. For half of the participants, positive was displayed at 
the top-left corner and negative at the top-right, whereas the reverse occurred for the 
remaining participants. There were 10 negatively-valence words and 10 positively-
valence words. The third block involved combining concept-attribute into new categories. 
For half the participants, this first combined categorization was threat-consistent, as it 
involved pairing of uncertain with negative, and correspondingly, certain with positive. 
For the remaining participants, the threat-inconsistent categorization was assessed (i.e. 
uncertain paired with positive, and certain paired with negative). All 40 words were 
utilized in this block of trials. The fourth block involved the same stimuli and 
categorizations as the first block (i.e. certain and uncertain), however the display 
locations for the two categories were reversed. The final block was similar to the third 
block, in that the concepts and attributes were again combined and the same stimuli were 
utilized. However, the combined categories differed in that participants receiving threat-
consistent categorization in third block received the threat-inconsistent categorization in 
the final block and those receiving threat-inconsistent categorization in block three 
received threat-consistent categorization in the final block. Appendix G includes a list of 
the 40 stimulus words utilized in this task. The average and standard deviations of RTs, 
and number of correct trials for blocks three and five were used to calculate a difference 
score for each participant, as described by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). 
Catastrophizing Interview (Provencher et al., 2000; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992) is a 
validated worry task designed to assess different aspects of the worry process. Although 
originally developed to assess worry within the last six months, the Catastrophizing 
Interview was used in the current study to assess for state worry. There are three phases 
to the interview. In the first phase (i.e., topic generation), participants were asked to recall 
all current worry themes present during the past month, then to indicate using a 
comprehensive list of worry themes, any other current worries. During the 
catastrophizing phase, participants engaged in a forced worry chain, whereby the 
interviewer asked: "What is it about {worry theme) that worries you?". Once a response 
was provided (i.e. feared consequence), the interviewer asked the next question: "If this 
actually happened, what are you afraid would happen next?". This question was repeated 
until the participant was no longer able to generate feared consequences. Participants 
were then asked to rate the likelihood of each feared consequence, using a scale ranging 
from 0 (Not at all likely) to 100 (Definite). This process was repeated for all worry 
themes generated in the initial phase of the Catastrophizing Interview. In the final phase, 
the interviewer rated the seventy of the final feared consequence of each worry theme, 
using the Consequence Severity Grid (CSG), which provides severity ratings that range 
from 1 to 8. The average number of feared consequences per worry theme, average 
likelihood ratings per feared consequence per worry theme, and average severity of final 
feared consequences were collected and used for data analysis. See Appendix H for a 
copy of the CSG. 
Results 
Preparation ofI AT Score 
As described above, a difference score for the IAT was calculated. Response 
times (RTs) for both threat consistent and threat inconsistent trials of the IAT below 
300ms or above 10000ms were deleted. The mean for threat consistent trials was 
computed and used to replace RTs for trials in which an error was made, along with a 
600ms error penalty. The same procedure was applied to threat inconsistent trials. For the 
negative induction group, the average number of errors made for threat-consistent trials 
was 1.66 (SD = 1.47), and 5.34 (SD = 7.05) for threat-inconsistent trials. The positive 
induction group made 1.26 (SD = 1.52) errors on average for threat-consistent trials, and 
4.00 (SD = 3.09) for threat-inconsistent trials. Finally, adjusted means and standard 
deviations for both threat consistent and threat inconsistent trials were calculated and 
used to compute the difference score. 
Inter-rater Agreement 
Given that the severity of the final feared consequence of each worry theme on 
the Catastrophizing Interview was assessed by the interviewer, an additional rating was 
provided by a second individual (an undergraduate student trained by Nicole Gervais) to 
calculate inter-rater agreement using the CSG. The criterion for agreement on the severity 
of the final consequence of each worry theme was defined by a difference of no more 
than 1 point on the CSG. Using this criterion, the obtained kappa score was K = .60. 
Data Screening 
Data from 70 participants were screened for normality of the distribution, and for 
univariate and multivariate outliers for all baseline measures. One univariate outlier was 
identified on the BDI-II and was deleted from subsequent analyses. Although eight 
multivariate outliers were found, Cook's distance revealed that none influenced the 
analyses. Thus the multivariate outliers were retained for subsequent analyses. 
Power analyses conducted on a portion of the final sample revealed that a sample 
size of 69 is sufficient to detect an effect (see Appendix I for details of the Power 
analyses). As such, the final sample size for the current study was deemed adequate. 
Preliminary A nalyses 
Independent samples t-tests and chi-square tests revealed no significant group 
differences on age (t(67) = 1.44,/? = .16), sex ratio (%2 = 1.86,;? - .17), STAI-T (7(67) = 
0.08,;? = .94), BDI-II (/(67) = 0.10,;? - .92), SDS-SF (t(66) = 133, p = .19), and the five 
baseline VAS (/(67) = 0.04 to 1.16,/? = .25 to .97). In addition, the groups did not differ 
in the amount of change on any of the VAS scales from pre- to post-test (/(67) = 0,43 to 
1.81,/? = .08 to .67). Finally, there was an equal number of participants within each group 
receiving either the threat-consistent or the treat-inconsistent trials first (%2 = 1.76, p = 
. 18). Descriptive information for the induction groups and total sample is presented in 




Response times to probe trials. To assess the immediate efficacy of the induction 
training on interpretation, RTs to complete word fragments on both negative and positive 
probe trials were analyzed. After omitting RTs of incorrect trials, the RTs of the 
remaining trials were averaged for each participant across the ten negative and ten 
positive trials. A two-way mixed factorial analysis of variance was conducted with 
induction group (negative vs. positive training) as the between-subjects factor and probe 
valence (negative vs. positive trials) as the within-subjects factor. The average number of 
errors made for the negative induction group was 0.37 (SD - 0.58) for negative probes 
and 0.37 (SD = 0.50) for positive probes. For the positive group, the average number of 
errors made was 0.33 (SD = 0.48) for negative probes, and 0.37 (SD = 0.57) for positive 
probes. Results indicate a significant main effect of probe (F(l, 67) = 9.85,/) < .01, 
partial rj2 = .13), with quicker RTs for positive (M= 2045.41ms, SD = 861.17ms) than 
negative trials (M= 2249.91ms, SD = 871.62ms). However, there was no significant 
main effect of training (F(l, 67) = 0.90, p = .35, partial r\2 - .01) on RT. Further, there 
was a significant Group X Probe interaction (F(\, 67) = 28.01, p < .001, partial r| - .30). 
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed no significant difference in RTs to 
the different probes for the negative training group (M positive = 2129.09ms, SD = 
811.55ms vs. M negative = 1985.24ms, SD = 606.97,/? = .13). However, the positive 
training resulted in quicker RTs to the positive probes than the negative probes (M 
positive = 1959.26ms, SD = 913.54ms vs. M negative = 2522.36ms, SD = 1017.42ms,/? < 
.001). This interaction is represented graphically in Figure 1. 
Manipulation check. To assess whether the induction training resulted in changes 
in interpretative style, mean ratings for each participant were calculated separately across 
the four different interpretations and used in two 2-way mixed factorial ANOVAs, one 
for the foil interpretations, and a second for feasible interpretations. Induction group 
(negative vs. positive training) served as the between-subjects factor and interpretive 
valence (negative vs. positive interpretation) as the within-subjects factor. After applying 
a Bonferroni correction to control for family-wise error, no significant main effect of 
valence was found for foil (F(l, 67) = 5.18,/? = .03, partial r|2 = .07), nor for feasible 
(F(\, 67) = 0.03,p = .87, partial r) = .00) interpretations. In addition, there was no main 
effect of group for either analysis (F(l, 67) = 0.00, p = .97, partial r|2 = .00 for foil, F{ 1, 
67) = 0.60, p = .44, partial r| = .01 for feasible). However, both analyses revealed a 
significant Group X Valence interaction (F(\, 67) = 15.46,p < .001, partial r|2 = .19 for 
foil, F(l, 67) = 28.64,/? < .001, partial r|2 = .30, for feasible interpretations). Bonferroni-
corrected pairwise comparisons of the induction groups for the foil interpretation ratings 
revealed no significant group differences for either the negatively (M negative group = 
1.71, SD - 0.52 vs. Mpositive group = 1.46, SD = 0.51,/? = .052) or positively-valenced 
(Mnegative group = 1.60, SD = 0.57 vs. Mpositive group= 1.86, SD = 0.68,/? = .09) 
interpretations. However, significant differences were found between induction groups 
for both the negatively (M negative group = 2.89, SD = 0.42 vs. Mpositive group = 2.52, 
SD = 0.53,/? < .01) and positively-valenced (Mnegative group = 2.52, SD = 0.45 vs. M 
positive = 2.97, SD = 0.49,/? < .001) feasible interpretation ratings. These two 
interactions are presented in Figure 2. 
Main Analyses 
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Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale. To test the first hypothesis that interpretive bias 
induction training would lead to difference in explicit beliefs about uncertainty, an 
ANOVA was conducted. Results revealed no significant difference between groups (F(l, 
67) = 1.07, p = .31, partial r|2 = .02) on the IUS. Thus, although training resulted in 
interpretive biases in the expected direction, this training did not influence scores on the 
IUS. Means and standard deviations on the IUS for each induction group and the total 
sample are presented in Table 3. 
Implicit Association Test. The IAT was used to assess the relative strength of 
threat consistent word pairings and threat inconsistent word pairings, whereby quicker 
RTs to correctly classify a word into one category versus another would suggest a 
stronger association. It was expected that regardless of training, participants would 
demonstrate quicker RTs to threat-consistent than threat-inconsistent trials. As such, a 
paired-samples t-test was conducted and revealed a significant difference between the 
two types of word pairings (f(67) = 11.00, p < .001) in the predicted direction. 
Specifically, participants were quicker to correctly classify words in treat-consistent than 
threat-inconsistent word pairings. 
To assess the second hypothesis that interpretive bias induction training would 
lead to a discrepancy between the two groups on the IAT difference score, a univariate 
ANOVA was conducted. Results revealed no significant difference between groups (F(l, 
67) = 0.69,/? = .41, partial rj2 = .01). Means and standard deviations for both RTs of 
threat-consistent and threat-inconsistent word pairings on the IAT for each induction 
group and the total sample are presented in Table 3. 
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Catastrophizing Interview. Given that three ratings were collected from this 
measure, including the average number of feared consequences per worry theme, average 
likelihood ratings of each feared consequence per worry theme, and average severity of 
final feared consequences, the ratings were combined in order to assess the final 
hypothesis that inducing an interpretive bias would lead to differences in the worry 
process. A multivariate analysis of variance was conducted to examine group differences 
on the composite of the worry ratings. Results indicate no significant difference between 
the two induction groups (F(3, 56) = 2.56, p = .06, r|2 = .12). Means and standard 
deviations for all three worry measures on the Catastrophizing Interview for each 
induction group and the total sample are presented in Table 3. 
Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to examine the role of interpretive bias in 
worry by manipulating interpretations of ambiguous social events. Results from the 
induction training and manipulation check suggest that interpretive bias was successfully 
induced. While RTs to the two probe types during training were not significantly 
different in the negative induction group, the positive induction group was quicker to 
respond to positive probes than negative probes. On the subsequent manipulation check, 
however, significant group differences were observed with respect to feasible 
interpretations of ambiguous social situations. Specifically, relative to the negative 
induction group, the positive induction group rated the positive interpretations as more 
similar and the negative interpretations as less similar to the original scenarios. However, 
given the limited research assessing generalizability of the induction paradigm to other 
interpretive bias measures (Salemink et al., 2007b; Salemink et al., in press), it is difficult 
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to ascertain whether the induction can extend beyond the paradigm used. Including 
multiple measures of interpretive bias (e.g., AUSD; Davey et al., 1992) may have 
clarified the generalizability of the findings. 
It was predicted that following successful induction of interpretive bias, the 
negative group would report significantly more negative beliefs about uncertainty, 
demonstrate stronger automatic threat associations related to uncertainty, and display 
more worry relative to the positive group. There were no statistically significant 
differences between the two induction groups on any of the dependent variables. 
Although none of the hypotheses were confirmed, there are many potential explanations 
for the null findings. For example, it is possible that negative beliefs about uncertainty, 
automatic associations related to uncertainty, and worry are not amenable to change from 
this type of induction procedure. Stated differently, an interpretive bias may have been 
successfully induced, but the bias may not have activated the cognitive fear structure. 
Both explicit beliefs about uncertainty and automatic associations related to uncertainty 
are believed to be different aspects of the cognitive fear structure (Koerner & Dugas, 
2008; Teachman et al., 2008). Also, the worry variables assessed in the present study are 
believed to be influenced by activation of the cognitive fear structure (Provencher et al., 
2000). As such, had the cognitive fear structure been activated, this activation should 
have been reflected in the dependent measures. 
Further, and in contrast to previous research (Mathews & Macintosh, 2000; 
Salemink et al., 2007a,b; Yiend et al., 2005), the interpretive bias had no observable 
effect on state anxiety. 
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Previous studies included the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y) - State (STAI-S; 
Spielberger, 1983) as a measure of state anxiety, whereas the present study used a Visual 
Analogue Scale (VAS). Although the VAS is recommended for examining idiosyncratic 
changes (Crichton 2001), perhaps the STAI-S is a more sensitive measure for the 
assessment of between-group differences. Given that the VAS contains two anchors with 
a large range (100-point scale) from no anxiety to extreme anxiety, perhaps this promotes 
larger within group variability than is obtained with the Likert scale of the STAI-S. Had 
the current study used the same measure of state anxiety as that used in previous studies, 
an effect of interpretive bias on state anxiety may have been observed. 
Another possibility is that change in cognitive vulnerability and worry requires 
multiple sessions of interpretive bias training. Beard and Amir (2008) conducted a study 
involving the modification of interpretive bias in a sample of socially anxious 
individuals. Interpretive bias modification involved a computerized interpretation 
modification program (IMP) designed to train individuals to make benign interpretations 
of ambiguous social situations and reject threatening ones. Following eight sessions of 
IMP, increases in benign interpretations and decreases in threatening interpretations of 
ambiguous social situations, as well as decreases in social anxiety symptoms, were 
reported relative to a control condition. In addition, change in benign interpretations was 
found to mediate the effect of the IMP on social anxiety symptoms, and was a significant 
predictor of change in social anxiety. These findings suggest that interpretive bias 
modification can lead to change in symptoms. In a similar study, Salemink, van den 
Hout, Kindt, and Rienties (2008) found that eight sessions of a modified version of the 
interpretive bias training paradigm developed by Mathews and Macintosh (2000) lead to 
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decreases in trait anxiety, depressive symptoms, and general psychopathological 
symptoms in a clinically anxious sample. In addition, Salemink et al. found that 
improvements were maintained at three-month follow-up. Taken together, these two 
studies suggest that interpretive bias training can lead to changes in symptoms, but that 
multiple days of training may be required. However, given that the participants in both 
studies were only assessed twice (pre-treatment and following the final training session), 
it is not possible to know if multiple sessions were actually required to produce the 
observed findings. Accordingly, future research should assess participants following each 
training session. 
No study to date has examined the effect of multi-session interpretive bias 
modification on cognitive vulnerability to anxiety. Had the current study involved 
multiple sessions of interpretive bias induction training, effects on cognitive vulnerability 
and worry may have been observed. Another possibility is that a minimum time delay 
between training and testing is required to allow for the consolidation of the training. 
Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, and Yiend, (2007) assessed the influence of a four-session 
interpretive bias modification paradigm on trait anxiety. Using a high trait-anxious 
sample, the authors randomly assigned participants to either an interpretive bias 
modification group, or a test-retest control group. The training resulted in increases in 
positive interpretations and decreases in threatening interpretations in the active group 
relative to the control group. In addition, although no group difference was found on state 
anxiety at post-training, the active group reported lower trait anxiety levels relative to the 
control group one week following treatment termination. Thus, perhaps changes in trait 
anxiety and other variables such as cognitive vulnerability and worry are delayed 
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following interpretive bias training and can only be observed if the assessment is 
conducted accordingly. 
Requiring either multiple sessions or a delay to promote consolidation (or a 
combination of the two) is consistent with assumptions underlying cognitive-behavioural 
therapy (CBT) for GAD. IU, an important treatment target in the CBT approach 
developed by Dugas and Ladouceur (2000), is addressed both directly and indirectly over 
multiple sessions of therapy. Research demonstrates that this treatment leads to decreases 
in IU and worry severity and that progress in level of IU continues over the course of 
two-year follow-up (Dugas et al., in press). There also exists evidence that shows IU can 
be modified in one test session, but only when using an experimental paradigm designed 
to target IU directly (Grenier &Ladouceur, 2004; Ladouceur, Gosselin et al., 2000). 
Although this research examined IU via explicit beliefs about uncertainty, other 
constructs related to cognitive fear structures have been shown to change across 
treatment. For example, Teachman and colleagues (Teachman et al., 2008; Teachman & 
Woody, 2003) demonstrated that automatic threat associations decrease across the course 
of CBT. There is also evidence that automatic associations can be manipulated directly in 
one test session (Rudman & Lee, 2002). Future research is needed to elucidate whether 
incorporating multiple sessions of interpretive bias training, introducing a time delay 
between the training and test, or a combination of the two, are required in order to 
observe congruent changes in cognitive vulnerability and worry. 
Given that previous research has demonstrated that changes in worry occur 
following successful manipulation of IU (i.e., Grenier & Ladouceur; Ladouceur, Gosselin 
et al., 2000; Rosen & Knauper, 2009), it is surprising that no group differences were 
detected on any of the worry measures taken from the Catastrophizmg Interview (Vasey 
& Borkovec, 1992; Provencher et al., 2000). Previous research has found differences 
between high and low worriers in terms of length of catastrophic sequences, likelihood 
ratings of consequences, and severity ratings of the final feared consequence when using 
the Catastrophizing Interview (Provencher et al., 2000; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992). With 
the exception of the present study, no research to date has been conducted to assess the 
relationship between interpretive bias and these three variables simultaneously. One 
study did assess the relationship between interpretive bias and perceived probability and 
perceived cost (Dellerba et al., 2007). Although perceived probability of the occurrence 
of a negative event was positively correlated with threatening interpretations of 
ambiguous scenarios, it did not mediate the relationship between these interpretations and 
IU. Perceived personal cost of negative outcomes was found to both correlate with threat 
interpretations of ambiguous scenarios and mediate the relationship between these 
interpretations and IU. A further study examining the role of perceived cost and 
perceived probability in worry found perceived cost to moderate the relationship between 
perceived probability and worry severity (Berenbaum, Thompson, & Pomerantz, 2007). 
These two studies suggest that perceived cost may be more important in the worry 
process than perceived probability. Despite this evidence, the interpretive bias induction 
training used in the present study did not alter cost ratings. Rather than assessing 
perceived cost, as was done previously, interviewer ratings of cost for the final 
consequence of each worry topic were used. Given that perceived cost is a subjective 
assessment of the severity of the final consequences of worries, perhaps it is sensitive to 
cognitive fear structure activation, whereas interviewer-rated severity is not. Stated 
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differently, it is possible that the change produced by the induction training on severity of 
final consequences of worries was subjective in nature. Had a more subjective self-report 
measure been used, perhaps differences on participant-rated perceptions of costs would 
have been observed (even if objective interviewer ratings remained similar in both 
conditions). 
Although the training involved learning to make either negative or positive 
interpretations of social situations, there is reason to believe that this training extends to 
other life domains or situations. For example, Salemink and colleagues (in press) showed 
that the induction paradigm generalizes to situations concerning academic performance. 
In addition, following an interpretive bias modification for ambiguous social situations, 
Salemink and colleagues (2008) demonstrated symptom reduction in a clinically anxious 
sample that included patients with GAD. As such, it does not appear likely that the choice 
of life domain for the interpretive bias training explains the lack of effect on GAD-related 
variables. 
There are a number of limitations to the current study that should be noted. As 
reported by Salemink and colleagues (2007a,b), the interpretive bias induction training 
may not generalize across tasks. Thus, omission of an additional measure of interpretive 
bias poses one major limitation to the present study. Another important limitation was 
that the experimenter was not blind to participant group membership; therefore, the 
experimenter may have unwittingly treated individuals from each group differently. This 
may have influenced the administration of the Catastrophizing Interview in particular, 
given that the interview was administered by the experimenter. 
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Another limitation of the study involves the assessment of anxiety. Previous 
research assessing the role of interpretive bias in anxiety has measured state anxiety using 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y) - State (STAI-S; Spielberger, 1983). Since the 
present study used a different measure (VAS), it is difficult to interpret the discrepant 
findings. However, both measures have demonstrated sound psychometric properties 
(Grant et al., 1999; Spielberger, 1983) and are therefore appropriate options for assessing 
state anxiety. 
Finally, although the word stimuli used to assess automatic threat associations 
related to uncertainty have been used in previous research (i.e., Anderson, Gervais, & 
Dugas, 2007; Heinecke, Koerner, Mogg, & Dugas, 2006), the IAT as a measure of such 
associations has yet to be validated. This task has been used in previous research using 
word stimuli to distinguish individuals with panic disorder from non-anxious controls 
(Teachman et al., 2007) and socially anxious individuals from non-anxious controls (de 
Jong et al., 2001). It remains to be seen whether individuals with GAD are 
distinguishable from non-anxious controls on automatic threat associations related to 
uncertainty using this task. Further, it remains to be seen whether automatic threat 
associations related to uncertainty are associated with worry severity, IU, interpretive 
bias, and other GAD-related variables. Given the findings from research on automatic 
threat associations related to other anxiety disorders, and given the abundant research 
linking IU to GAD, it would not be surprising to find evidence of such relationships. 
Despite these limitations, the present study has several notable strengths. For one, 
this is the first study, to our knowledge, to assess the impact of inducing interpretive bias 
on GAD-related variables. It is also the first study that attempted to test the potential 
effects of interpretive bias on these variables using an experimental design. The present 
study also incorporated a semi-structured interview assessing different aspects of the 
worry process. Whereas previous research typically assessed worry severity, the current 
study included an assessment of likelihood and cost ratings, which are believed to be 
important aspects of the worry process and have been shown to be related to interpretive 
bias (Berenbaum, Thompson, & Bredemeier, 2007; Berenbaum, Thompson, & 
Pomerantz, 2007; Dellerba et al., 2007). Finally, this was the first attempt at examining 
automatic threat associations related to uncertainty and at determining whether they are 
malleable following interpretive bias training. Cognitive theory claims that cognitive fear 
structures contain both automatic and controlled (or strategic) processes (Beck & Clark, 
1997; Segal 1988). Thus, developing an understanding of the role of automatic 
associations in the etiology and maintenance of worry and GAD, as well as in cognitive 
change during treatment is just as crucial to understanding the role of explicit beliefs. As 
such, there are a number of directions for future research. 
Although the present study builds on previous research examining the role of 
interpretive bias in GAD, more research is necessary to understand its precise role. The 
goal of the current study was to determine whether inducing an interpretive bias would 
have an effect on both cognitive vulnerability and worry processes. Although the findings 
suggest that interpretive bias training does not influence these variables, future research 
should continue examining its precise role, given what has been learned thus far about 
interpretive bias in GAD. Research should continue examining its potential causal role, 
with some modifications to the procedure used in the current study (e.g., incorporating 
multiple training sessions and additional measures of interpretive bias). Further, studies 
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should examine the efficacy of the training paradigm developed by Mathews and 
Macintosh (2000) in a GAD sample. Future research should also focus on whether 
automatic threat associations related to uncertainty are involved in worry and GAD. This 
can be done by determining whether performance on this task can distinguish individuals 
with GAD from non-anxious controls, and whether this performance is associated with 
GAD-related variables. It is also important to determine whether such associations are 
amenable to change during treatment for GAD. 
Even though there were no observable effects on GAD-related variables, 
interpretive bias training may still prove to be clinically useful. The present study 
illustrates the difficulty in achieving cognitive and symptom change following a brief 
intervention. Given that other studies (i.e., Beard & Amir, 2008; Salemink et al., 2008) 
have shown that such changes can occur following multiple therapy sessions, it may be 
unrealistic to expect such changes to occur following one interpretive bias training 
session. However, the clinical utility of multiple interpretive bias training sessions can be 
called into question as it is extremely unlikely that such a technique would be as effective 
as current empirically-supported therapy options for anxiety disorders. Rather, it is 
possible that interpretive bias modification techniques may serve to facilitate gains 
achieved in therapy, or perhaps to increase the efficacy of current approaches. For 
example, such paradigms as those used by Beard and Amir (2008) and Salemink and 
colleagues (2008) could be incorporated into CBT approaches as exercises to be 
completed multiple times during therapy. 
In summary, the present study shows that interpretive bias can be induced using 
the paradigm developed by Mathews and Macintosh (2000). Conversely, no support was 
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found for the causal role of interpretive bias in cognitive vulnerability for worry. 
Contrary to previous research, there was no evidence suggesting that interpretive bias 
training influences state anxiety. However, there are a number of potential explanations 
for the observed findings. More research is necessary before concluding whether or not 
interpretive bias plays a causal role in GAD-related cognitive vulnerability and worry. In 
addition to developing a greater understanding of the role of interpretive bias, research 
aimed at modifying interpretive bias has important treatment implications. It remains to 
be seen whether decreases in interpretive bias occur during treatment of GAD and if so, 
whether they lead to decreases in symptoms and cognitive vulnerability. Research aimed 
at answering such questions may lead to adjustments to current treatment approaches. 
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Table 1 
Mean and Standard Deviation for Baseline Measures for Induction Groups and Total 
Sample (N' = 69) 
Negative Positive Total 
Baseline Measures M £D M~ SD M SD 
~Age 26.83 9^02 30.12 9M 28.45 9ST 
STAI-T 40.09 11.24 40.31 11.85 40.20 11.46 
BDI-II 9.51 8.40 9.32 7.93 9.42 8.12 
SDS-SF 6.44 2.80 7.27 2.29 6.85 2.57 
Note. STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory- Trait; BDI-II = Beck Depression 
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Mean and Standard Deviation for the IUS, IAT, CI for Induction Groups and Total 
Sample (N = 69) 
Negative (n = 35) Positive («= 34) Total 
Variables M SD M S~D M SD 
l U S 5631 19l3 61.32 21.17 58.78 20.17 
IAT 
Threat-consistent 945.68 227.75 1009.49 321.93 977.12 277.96 
Threat-inconsistent 1715.92 629.56 1968.36 946.19 1840.31 805.48 
CI 
Number 4.20 1.31 4.97 1.97 4.56 1.68 
Likelihood 31.82 15.81 24.29 11.18 28.30 14.24 
Severity 3.53 1.50 3.44 1.49 3.49 1.49 
Note. IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; IAT = Implicit Association Test; CI = 
Catastrophizing Interview; Number = average number of feared consequences per worry 
theme; Likelihood = average likelihood ratings of feared consequences per worry theme; 
Severity = average severity of final feared consequences. 
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Figure Captions 
1. Figure 1. Average response time (RT) to solve word fragments of negative and positive 
probes for the negative (n = 35) and positive (n = 34) induction groups. 
2. Figure 2. Ratings of negatively and positively-valencedfoil and feasible 
interpretations for the negative (n = 35) and positive (n = 34) induction groups. 
Figure 1. Average response time (RT) to solve word fragments of negative and positive 
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(Between 18 and 55 - if not then EXCLUDE) 
2a). First language: 
2c). If English not first language, fluent?: YES: NO: 
3. Wear glasses/contact lenses? (Maybe we can ask this question so that they can be flagged in the 
excel sheet so I will know to remind them to bring their glasses for the two visits to the lab). 
YES: NO: 
4. Are you currently taking any medication? YES: NO: 
IF YES: What is the name of your medication(s)?: 
How long have you been taking this medication?: (4 weeks stable for Benzodiazepines, & 12 
weeks for other medications. If they take benzos p.r.n., they need to be flagged in excel document so 
that experimenter can remind them to not take 4 hrs prior to testing session) 
STABLE: YES: NO: (if no, what is nature of unstable...benzo p.r.n.? recent 
increase/decrease? Change in meds?) 
5. Have you ever been diagnosed as having a reading disability? YES: NO: 
(IF YES for reading disability - EXCL UDE) 
6. Have you ever been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or any other mental 
illness? YES: NO: 
YES: specify which 
(IF YES for schizophrenia, bipolar, or other organic mental disorder - EXCLUDE) 
63 
7. Do you have any other medical conditions? {hyperthyroidism, hypoglycemia, anemia etc.): 
YES: NO: 
IF YES: specify which 
8. Have you ever been diagnosed with an anxiety disorder? 
YES: NO: 
YES: specify which disorder and when were they diagnosed? 
9. Currently experiencing any thoughts of suicide? 
YES: NO: 
If YES... 
4. What kind of thoughts of death or suicide have you had? Assess: Concreteness of ideas; 
presence of specific plan; access to method for carrying out plan; specific timeline for plan; ability to 
state reasons for living. Note the difference between actual suicidal ideation and self-harm 
obsessions. In Self-harm obsessions, thoughts about death or harming oneself are intrusive in that 
the person does not want to have them (egodystonic). The person may fear that because they are 
having these re-occurring thoughts, they might commit suicide without actually wanting to. 
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i Based on the person's description above, check one of the 4 LEVELS below: 
LEVEL 0: No current suicidal ideation 
. LEVEL 1: Vague thoughts about suicide, but no plan 
. LEVEL 2: Fuzzy plan (i.e. would take pills, but don't know specifically what pills, or how many 
are needed, or where to get these pills etc...) 
. LEVEL 3: Clear plan, but no intention or timeline of when it will take place 
LEVEL 4: Clear plan and clear intention of when it will take place 
5. Have you ever acted on thoughts about suicide, or attempted suicide? 
If YES, How long ago? 
ATTEMPT 0: Never attempted suicide 
ATTEMPT 1: Suicide attempted more than 2 years ago 
ATTEMPT 2: Suicide attempt made within the past 2 years 
Based on the responses above, check one of the categories below: 
ATTEMPT 0 
+ LEVEL 0 OK 
+ LEVEL 1 OK 
+ LEVEL 2 _ EXCLUDE 
+ LEVEL 3 EXCLUDE 
+ LEVEL 4 EXCLUDE 
ATTEMPT 1 
+ LEVEL 0 OK 
+ LEVEL 1 EXCLUDE 
+LEVEL 2 EXCLUDE 
+LEVEL 3 EXCLUDE 
+LEVEL 4 EXCLUDE 
ATTEMPT 2 
+ ANY LEVEL EXCLUDE 
IF EXCLUDED AT 
LEVEL 3 or LEVEL 4: Contact Michel. Con U: ext 2215; Clinic (514)338-4201; Home (450)971-
2913. 
LEVEL 3: Confirm absence of immediate intention; give referral/number for helpline, information 
about nearest hospital emergency, and any other information participant requests. 
Any other level of exclusion, offer participant referral/number for helpline. 
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Appendix B 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y) - Trait 
STAI 
STAI Form Y-2 
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A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read 
each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate how 
you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any 
one statement but give the answer which seems to describe how you generally feel. 
Almost Never Sometimes Often Almost Always 
1. I feel pleasant 1 2 3 4 
2.1 feel nervous and restless 1 2 3 4 
3. I feel satisfied with myself. 1 2 3 4 
4.1 wish I could be as happy 
as others seem to be 1 2 3 4 
5. I feel like a failure 1 2 3 4 
6.1 feel rested 1 2 3 4 
7. lam "calm, cool, and collected". 1 2 3 4 
8.1 feel that difficulties are piling 
up so that I cannot overcome 
them 1 2 3 4 
9. I worry too much over something 
that really doesn't matter 1 2 3 4 
30. I am happy 1 2 3 4 
67 
STAI Page 2 of 2 
Almost Never Sometimes Often Almost Always 
11.1 have disturbing thoughts 1 2 3 4 
12. I lack self-confidence 1 2 3 4 
13. I feel secure 1 .. 2 3 4 .... 
14.1 make decisions easily 1 .....2 3 4 
15.1 feel inadequate 1 2 3 4 
16. I am content 1 2 3 4 
17. Some unimportant thought runs 
through my mind and bothers me 1 2 3 4.. 
18.1 take disappointments so keenly 
that I can't put them out of my 
mind 1 2 3 4.. 
19. I am a steady person 1 2 3 4.. 
20. I get in a state of tension or 
turmoil as I think over my recent 
concerns and interests 1 2 3 4. 
© Copyright 1968, 1977 by Chales D. Spielberger. STAIP-AD Test Form Y 
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Appendix C 




This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully, 
and then pick out the one statement in each group that best describes the way you have been feeling 
during the past two weeks, including today. Circle the number beside the statement you have picked. 
If several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, circle the highest number for that group. 
Be sure that you do not choose more than one statement for each group, including Item 16 (Changes 
in Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in Appetite). 
1) Sadness 
0 I do not feel sad. 
1 I feel sad much of the time. 
2 I am sad all the time. 
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it. 
2) Pessimism 
0 I am not discouraged about my future. 
1 I feel more discouraged about my future than 1 used to be. 
2 I do not expect things to work out for me. 
3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse. 
3) Past Failure 
0 I do not feel like a failure. 
1 I have failed more than I should have. 
2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures. 
3 I feel I am a total failure as a person. 
4) Loss of Pleasure 
0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy. 
1 I don't enjoy things as much as I used to. 
2 I get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
3 I can't get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
5) Guilty Feelings 
0 I don't feel particularly guilty. 
1 I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done. 
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
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BDI-II Page 2 of 4 
6) Punishment Feelings 
0 I don't feel I am being punished. 
1 I feel I may be punished. 
2 I expect to be punished. 
3 I feel I am being punished. 
7) Self-Dislike 
0 I feel the same about myself as ever. 
1 I have lost confidence in myself. 
2 I am disappointed in myself. 
3 I dislike myself. 
8) Self-Criticalness 
0 I don't criticize or blame myself more than usual. 
1 I am more critical of myself than I used to be. 
2 1 criticize myself for all my faults. 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
9) Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes 
0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
2 1 would like to kill myself. 
3 1 would kill myself if I had the chance. 
10) Crying 
0 I don't cry any more than I used to. 
1 I cry more now than I used to. 
2 I cry over every little thing. 
3 I feel like crying but I can't. 
11) Agitation 
0 I am no more restless or wound up than usual. 
1 I feel more restless or wound up than usual. 
2 I am so restless or agitated that it's hard to stay still. 
3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep moving or doing something. 
12) Loss of Interest 
0 I have not lost interest in people or activities. 
1 I am less interested in other people or things than before. 
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people or things. 
3 It's hard to get interested in anything. 
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BDM] Page 3 of 4 
13) Indecisiveness 
0 I make decisions about as well as ever. 
1 I find it more difficult to make decisions than usual. 
2 I have much greater difficulty in making decisions than I used to. 
3 I have trouble making any decision. 
14) Worthlessness 
0 I do not feel 1 am worthless. 
1 I don't consider myself as worthwhile and useful as I used to. 
2 I feel more worthless as compared to other people. 
3 I feel utterly worthless. 
15) Loss of Energy 
0 I have as much energy as ever. 
1 I have less energy than 1 used to have. 
2 I don't have enough energy to do very much. 
3 I don't have enough energy to do anything. 
16) Changes in Sleeping Pattern 
0 I have not experienced any changes in my sleeping pattern. 
la I sleep somewhat more than usual. 
lb I sleep somewhat less than usual. 
2a I sleep a lot more than usual. 
2b I sleep a lot less than usual. 
3a I sleep most of the day. 
3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can't get back to sleep. 
17) Irritability 
0 I am no more irritable than usual. 
1 I am more irritable than usual. 
2 I am much more irritable than usual. 
3 1 am irritable all the time. 
18) Changes in Appetite 
0 I have not experienced any changes in my appetite. 
la My appetite is somewhat less than usual. 
lb My appetite is somewhat greater than usual. 
2a My appetite is much less than before. 
2b My appetite is much greater than usual. 
3a I have no appetite at all. 
3b I crave food all the time. 
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BDI-II Page 4 of 4 
19) Concentration Difficulty 
0 I can concentrate as well as usual. 
1 I can't concentrate as well as usual. 
2 It's hard to keep my mind on anything for very long. 
3 I find I can't concentrate on anything. 
20) Tiredness or Fatigue 
0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual. 
1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual. 
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things I used to do. 
3 I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the things I used to do. 
21) Loss of Interest in Sex 
0 1 have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
2 I am much less interested in sex now. 
3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
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Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Please read each 
item and circle T (true) or F (false) as it pertains to you. 
T F 1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. 
T F 2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 
T F 3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing 
something because I thought too little of my ability. 
T F 4. There have been times when 1 felt like rebelling against 
people in authority even though I knew they were right. 
T F 5. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. 
T F 6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 
T F 7. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
T F 8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
T F 9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
T F 10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. 
T F 11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. 
T F 12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 
T F 13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. 
Reynolds, W.M. (1982). 
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Appendix E 
Visual Analogue Scales 
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Before 
Please rate your current level of anxiety on the scale below by marking a line 
between 0 (Not at all anxious) and 100 (Extremely anxious) 
0 — 100 
Not at all anxious Extremely anxious 
Please rate your current level of sadness on the scale below by marking a line 
between 0 (Not at all sad) and 100 (Extremely sad) 
0 _ _ _ _ _ ^ ^ ^ _ _ _ _ ioo 
Not at all sad Extremely sad 
Please rate your current level of worry on the scale below by marking a line 
between 0 (Not at all worried) and 100 (Extremely worried) 
o ioo 
Not at all worried Extremely worried 
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Before 
Please rate your current level of fatigue on the scale below by marking a line 
between 0 (No fatigue) and 100 (Extreme fatigue) 
0 100 
No fatigue Extreme fatigue 
Please rate your current level of irritability on the scale below by marking a line 
between 0 (Not at all irritable) and 100 (Extremely irritable) 
0 100 
Not at all irritable Extremely irritable 
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After 
Please rate your current level of anxiety on the scale below by marking a line 
between 0 (Not at all anxious) and 100 (Extremely anxious) 
0 100 
Not at all anxious Extremely anxious 
Please rate your current level of sadness on the scale below by marking a line 
between 0 (Not at all sad) and 100 (Extremely sad) 
0 100 
Not at all sad Extremely sad 
Please rate your current level of worry on the scale below by marking a line 
between 0 (Not at all worried) and 100 (Extremely worried) 
o — _ — _ _ _ _ _ _ ioo 
Not at all worried Extremely worried 
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After 
Please rate your current level of fatigue on the scale below by marking a line 
between 0 (No fatigue) and 100 (Extreme fatigue) 
0 — — — — — — — — 100 
No fatigue Extreme fatigue 
Please rate your current level of irritability on the scale below by marking a line 
between 0 (Not at all irritable) and 100 (Extremely irritable) 
0 — 100 
Not at all irritable Extremely irritable 
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You will find below a series of statements which describe how people may react to the uncertainties 
of life. Please use the scale below to describe to what extent each item is characteristic of you. Please 
circle a number (1 to 5) that describes you best. 
Not at all Somewhat Entirely 
characteristic characteristic characteristic 
of me of me of me 
1. Uncertainty stops me from 
having a firm opinion 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Being uncertain means that a 
person is disorganized 1..... 2 3 4 5 , 
3. Uncertainty makes life 
intolerable 1 2 3 4 5 
4. It's unfair not having any 
guarantees in life 1 2 3 4 5 
5. My mind can't be relaxed if I 
don't know what will happen 
tomorrow 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Uncertainty makes me uneasy, 
anxious, or stressed 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Unforeseen events upset me 
greatly 1 2 3 4 5 
8. It frustrates me not having all 
the information I need 1 ..2 3 .....4 5 
9. Uncertainty keeps me from 
living a full life 1 2 3 4 5 
10. One should always look ahead 
so as to avoid surprises 1 2 3 4 5 
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Not at all 
characteristic 
of me 
11. A small unforeseen event can 
spoil everything, even with the 
best of planning ] 
12. When it's time to act, 
uncertainty paralyses me 1 
13. Being uncertain means that I am 
not first rate 1 
14. When I am uncertain, I can't go 
forward 1 
15. When I am uncertain 1 can't 
function very well 1 
16. Unlike me, others always seem 
to know where they are going 
with their lives 1 
17. Uncertainty makes me 
vulnerable, unhappy, or sad 1 
18. I always want to know what the 
future has in store for me 1 
19. I can't stand being taken by 
surprise 1 
20. The smallest doubt can stop me 
from acting ] 
21.1 should be able to organize 
everything in advance 1 
22. Being uncertain means that I 
lack confidence 1 
Page 2 of 3 
Somewhat Entirely 
characteristic characteristic 
of me of me 
.2 3 4 5 
.2 3 4 5 
.2 3 4 5 
.2 3 4 5 
.2 3 4 5 
.2.... 3 4 5 
.2 3 4 5 
.2 3 4 5 
.2 3 4 5 
.2 3 4 5 
.2 3 4 5 
.2 3. 4 5. 
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IUS Page 3 of 3 
Not at all Somewhat Entirely 
characteristic characteristic characteristic 
of me of me of me 
23. I think it's unfair that other 
people seem sure about their 
future 1 2 3 4 5 
24. Uncertainty keeps me from 
sleeping soundly 1 2 3 4 5 
25. I must get away from all 
uncertain situations 1 2 3 4 5 
26. The ambiguities in life stress me 1 2 3 4. 5 
27. I can't stand being undecided 
about my future 1 2 3 4 5 
Origian! French Version: Freeston. M.H., Rheaume, J., Letarle, H., Dugas, M.J., & Ladouceur. R. (1994): Why do people worry? 
Personality and Individual Differences, 77(6), 791-802. 
English Version: Buhr, K.. Dugas, M. J. (2002). The intolerance of uncertainly scale: psychometric properties of the English version. 
Behavior Research and Therapy, 40, 931-945. 
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Consequence Severity Grid 
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Consequence Severity Grid 
1) Symptoms or difficulties do not affect individual's functioning 
a) Emotional: absence of positive emotion (inattention, bored, uneasiness, etc.) 
b) Interpersonal: disagreement with someone 
c) Behavioural/Occupational: take a little more time 
d) Others: 
e) Society: 
2) Mild symptoms or difficulties affect some of the individual's functioning 
a) Emotional: negative emotion (stressed, depressed, ashamed, guilty, discouraged, lonely, 
etc.), difficulty concentrating, anxious symptoms (palpitations, shaking, insomnia, etc.) 
b) Interpersonal: arguments with family 
c) Behavioural/Occupational: finish work late, unsatisfied at work, etc. 
d) Others: my parents are unhappy 
e) Society: 
3) Moderate symptoms or difficulties affect individual's functioning with increasing 
intensity or frequency, but non-chronic 
a) Emotional: panic attacks, feeling like you're nothing, wanting to be alone 
b) Interpersonal: arguments with significant other, problems with boss or colleagues, few 
friends, not speaking to family, loss of friends, etc. 
c) Behavioural/Occupational: fails a class, becomes sick 
d) Others: hurt others, loved one falls ill 
e) Society: 
4) Serious symptoms or difficulties cause observable and persistent interference in 
the individual 
a) Emotional: Mood disorder (depression, anxiety, etc.) 
b) Interpersonal: separation from wife/husband, no friends 
c) Behavioural/Occupational: incapable of holding a job, financial difficulties, academic 
failure 
d) Others: serious illness of loved one 
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e) Society 
5) Chronic symptoms or difficulties cause marked interference in multiple aspects of 
individual's life 
a) Emotional: Suicidal ideation, non-fatal accident with severe consequences (handicap, 
paralysis, disfiguration) 
b) Interpersonal: divorce 
c) Behavioural/Occupational: incapable of working, no work, on welfare, serious financial 
problems (in debt for rest of life) 
d) Others: death of husband/wife 
e) Society 
6) Extreme symptoms or difficulties cause marked interference in nearly all aspects 
of individual's life 
a) Emotional: Psychosis (become insane, etc), being a failure 
b) Interpersonal: no significant relationship 
c) Behavioural/Occupational: live in poverty, no home, become a beggar or homeless 
d) Others: death of child, suicide of husband/wife 
e) Society: concentration camps 
7) Catastrophic symptoms or difficulties cause harm to the individual's life without 
causing death 
a) Emotional: suicidal attempt, fatal disease (AIDS, cancer, etc) 
b) Interpersonal: none 
c) Behavioural/Occupational: none 
d) Others: none 
e) Society: natural disaster, epidemic, war, etc 
8) Fatal symptoms or difficulties cause immediate death of the individual or result in 
post-mortem consequences 
a) Emotional: suicide, burn in hell, does not rest in peace 
b) Interpersonal: none 
c) Behavioural/Occupational: none 
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d) Others: none 





Power and sample size calculations were determined from a subset of the final sample. 
These calculations involved calculating Cohen's d using the following formula: 
d = (meanneg - meanp0s)/ SQRT(((nneg - l)sneg2 + [(npos - l)sPos2)/(nneg + npos)) 
In order to determine an appropriate sample size, analyses for each of the five dependent 
variables were calculated using the following formula, assuming a Power of 0.8 and 




 [(Za/2 + zp) / d], where Za/2 = 1.96, and zp = 0.84 
DV Cohen's d Required sample size 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 0.18 242 
Implicit Association Test-Difference score 0.34 68 
Average length of catastrophic sequences 0.62 20 
Average probability ratings 0.68 17 
Severity of final consequences 0.09 969 
